

Assigned counsel	abogado de oficio
ATTEMPT – An effort to do an act or commit a crime.	TENTATIVA – Preparación para un acto delictivo o para cometer un delito.
ATTORNEY – Someone that is qualified to represent clients in court and to give them legal advice. (See COUNSEL).	ABOGADO – Una persona calificada para representar clientes en un tribunal y darles consejos legales.
assets and liabilities	activo y pasivo
Admonition	advertencia

Bail	A security deposit (usually money) given to release a defendant or witness from custody and to make sure that they go to court when they're supposed to. fianza
BANKRUPT – The state or condition of a person who is unable to pay his or her debts when they are due.	INSOLVENTE – El estado o condición de una persona que no puede pagar sus deudas al debido tiempo.
Bench	estrado, juez
BENCH TRIAL – Trial without a jury. The judge decides the case.	
Beyond a reasonable doubt The burden of proof in a criminal case requiring that the jury be convinced that every element of a crime has been proven by the prosecution.	más allá de una duda (fuera de duda) razonable
BONA FIDE – Sincere, real without fraud or deceit. Comes from the Latin "in good faith."	DE BUENA FE – Sincero, verdadero sin fraude ni engaño. Viene del latín "en buena fe."
Bodily injury	lesiones corporales
Brief	Alegato, escrito
Burden of proof	peso de la prueba
BRANDISHING A WEAPON – Showing a weapon to another person, typically the police or the victim.	BLANDIR UNA ARMA – Mostrar un arma a alguien, típicamente a la policía o a la víctima.
BREACH – The breaking or violating of a law, right, obligation, or duty either by doing an act or failing to do an act.	INCUMPLIMIENTO – Violación o quebrantamiento de una ley, derecho, obligación o deber al actuar o dejar de actuar.
Burglary	allanamiento con fines delictivos
burden of proof	carga de la prueba

CAPACITY – The person with the ability to perform under his or her will.	CAPACIDAD – Persona con la capacidad de actuar bajo su propia voluntad.
CASE – A lawsuit. Or a complaint filed in criminal, traffic, or civil court.	CASO – Un juicio. O una demanda presentada en cortes penales, de tráfico o civiles.
Case law Law made by earlier decisions in similar cases.	PRECEDENTES – Leyes creadas por previas decisiones en casos similares. Jurisprudencia
certificate of birth	certificado de nacimiento
Certainty	certeza, algo seguro
Certification	Constancia, certificación, certificado
CHAIN OF CUSTODY – A method to track the whereabouts of evidence from the moment it is received in custody until it is offered in court.	CADENA DE CUSTODIA – Un método para localizar el paradero de la evidencia desde el momento en que se recibe en custodia hasta que es ofrecida en el tribunal.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – All evidence that is indirect. Testimony not based on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in dispute.	PRUEBA CIRCUNSTANCIAL – Toda evidencia que es indirecta. Testimonio no basado en actual conocimiento personal u observación sobre las pruebas disputadas.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – The rules and process by which a civil case is tried and appealed, including the preparations for trial, the rules of evidence and trial conduct, and the procedure for pursuing appeals.	PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL – Las reglas y procedimientos mediante los cuales un caso civil es procesado y apelado, incluyendo las preparaciones para el juicio, las reglas de evidencia y conducta en el tribunal, y el procedimiento para solicitar apelaciones.
CIVIL PROCESS – Court papers that tell the people in a civil case that it has started. Or papers that try to force the court to reach a judgment.	PROCESO CIVIL – Documentos judiciales que explican a las personas que un caso civil ha comenzado. O documentos que tratan de forzar a un tribunal para llegar a una decisión.
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE – Standard of proof commonly used in civil lawsuits and in regulatory agency cases. It governs the amount of proof that must be offered in order for the plaintiff to win the case.	PRUEBA CLARA Y CONVINCENTE – Estándar de prueba comúnmente usado en demandas civiles y en casos de agencias regulatorias. Gobierna la cantidad de prueba que tiene que ofrecer el demandante para ganar la demanda.
CLERK – Officer of the court who files pleadings, motions, judgments, etc., issues process, and keeps records of court proceedings.	SECRETARIO DEL TRIBUNAL – Oficial del tribunal que archiva alegatas, mociones, sentencias, etc., reparte procedimientos y toma notas de los procedimientos del tribunal.
CODE – The law created by statutes. For example, the California Code of Civil Procedure, California Civil Code, California Vehicle Code, California Penal Code, and California Health and Safety Code.	CÓDIGO – La ley creada por estatutos. Por ejemplo, el Código de Procedimiento Civil de California, el Código de Vehículos de California, el Código Penal de California, y el Código de Salud y Seguridad de California.
COMMITMENT – 1. The action of sending a person to a prison or mental institution. 2. The order directing an officer to take a person to a prison or mental institution.	CONFINAMIENTO – 1. La acción de enviar una persona a una prisión o institución mental. 2. La orden por la que un oficial confina a alguien en una prisión o una institución mental.
COMPETENCY – The ability for a person to understand and communicate, especially	COMPETENCIA – La habilidad de una persona de comprender y comunicarse,

especially with regard to standing trial and assisting counsel in his or her defense.	especialmente con respecto a participar en el juicio y para asistir a su abogado en su propia defensa.
Complaint (civil)	demanda
Complaint (criminal)	denuncia (usually from aggrieved party), acusación, querrela
COMPLAINANT – Person who wants to start a court case against another person. In a civil case, the complainant is the PLAINTIFF. In a criminal case, the complainant is the state.	RECLAMANTE – Persona que desea comenzar un caso contra otra persona. En un caso civil, el reclamante es el DEMANDANTE. En un caso penal, el reclamante es el estado.
CONCURRING CAUSES – Acting contemporaneously and together causing injury, which would not have resulted in absence of either.	CAUSAS CONCURRENTES – Actos que ejecutados juntos y al mismo tiempo causan daños o lesiones, que no habrían resultado con la ausencia de cualquiera de los dos.
CONSENT – A written agreement to obey a decision or deal.	CONSENTIMIENTO – Un acuerdo escrito para obedecer una decisión o un acuerdo.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE – A legal doctrine that says if the plaintiff in a civil action for negligence also was negligent, in any way, he or she cannot recover damages from the defendant for the defendant's negligence.	NEGLIGENCIA CONTRIBUYENTE – Una doctrina legal que declara que si el demandante en una acción civil por negligencia fue también negligente, no puede de ninguna manera recuperar daños por la negligencia del acusado.
Convict (vb.)	condenar
CONVICT – (1) A person who has been found guilty of a crime and is serving a sentence for that crime; a prison inmate. (2) To find a person guilty of an offense by either a trial or a plea of guilty.	CONDENADO – (1) Una persona que ha sido declarada culpable de un delito y sirve una condena por ese delito; un interno de una prisión. (2) Determinar que una persona es culpable de un delito por juicio o por declaración de culpabilidad.
Conviction	fallo condenatorio, condena
CORPUS DILECTI – Body of the crime. The objective proof that a crime has been committed. It sometimes refers to the body of the victim of a homicide or to the charred remains of a burned house, but the term has a broader meaning. For the state to introduce a confession or to convict the accused, it must prove the occurrence of a specific injury or loss and a criminal act was the source of that particular injury or loss.	CUERPO DEL DELITO – La prueba objetiva que un delito se ha cometido. Se refiere a veces al cuerpo de la víctima de un homicidio o lo que queda de una casa quemada, pero el término tiene un significado más amplio. Para que el estado introduzca una confesión o para condenar al acusado, debe probarse la ocurrencia de un daño específico o pérdida y que un acto criminal fue la fuente de ese daño o pérdida particular.
Court deadlines	plazos procesales
Court of last resort	tribunal de última instancia
Criminal charges	cargos penales
Criminal history	antecedentes penales

Criminal record	antecedentes penales
Damages	daños y perjuicios, indemnización por daños y perjuicios
DECISION – A court's judgment or decree that settles a dispute. (See also DECREE, JUDGMENT.)	DECISION – El fallo o decreto del tribunal que concluye una disputa. (Ver DECRETO, SENTENCIA).
Deed	título de propiedad
DEFAMATION – When one person hurts another person's character, fame, or reputation by making false and malicious statements that are not protected by law.	DIFAMACION – Cuando una persona perjudica el carácter, la fama, o la reputación de otra persona haciendo declaraciones falsas y maliciosas que no son protegidas por la ley.
Default	rebeldía, incomparecencia
Default judgment	fallo en rebeldía
Defendant (civil)	demandado
Defendant (criminal)	acusado
Defense attorney	abogado defensor
DISMISS – To terminate legal action involving outstanding charges against a defendant in a criminal case. Dismiss (e.g., a case)	DESESTIMAR – Terminar la acción legal que involucra cargos pendientes contra el acusado en un caso penal.
DISSOLUTION OF A MARRIAGE – The act of terminating a marriage; divorce; but the term does not include annulment.	DISOLUCIÓN DE UN MATRIMONIO – El acto de terminar un matrimonio; divorcio, pero el término no incluye anulación.
Disposition of assets	enajenación de bienes
DIVORCE – A common name for a marriage that is legally ended. See DISSOLUTION.	DIVORCIO – Un nombre común para un matrimonio que es terminado legalmente. Ver DISOLUCIÓN.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – An assault committed by one member of a household against another.	VIOLENCIA DOMÉSTICA – Una agresión cometida por un miembro de un hogar contra otro.
DOMICILE – The place where a person has his or her permanent legal home. A person may have several residences, but only one domicile.	DOMICILIO – Lugar donde una persona ocupa su hogar legal permanente. Una persona puede tener varias residencias, pero sólo un hogar.
ELEMENTS OF A CRIME – Specific factors that define a crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction. The elements that must be proven are 1) that a crime has actually occurred, 2) that the accused intended the	ELEMENTOS DE UN DELITO – Los factores específicos que definen un delito que la fiscalía debe demostrar más allá de una duda razonable para obtener una

crime to happen, and 3) a timely relationship between the first two factors.	condena. Los elementos que deben ser probados son 1) que un delito ha ocurrido verdaderamente, 2) que el acusado intentó que el delito ocurriera, y 3) una relación oportuna entre los primeros dos factores.
Enforcement	ejecución, hacer cumplir
ESTATE – Everything a person (alive or dead) owns and owes. There are different types of estates, like probate, nonprobate, trust and taxable estates. Probate estate: The property in someone's will. Or, if they do not have a will, the property the probate court handles. Nonprobate estate: The property the probate court does not handle. For example, if there's a trust or joint tenancy. Trust estate: Property in a trust. A trustee controls the trust. Taxable estate: The property subject to federal estate tax when a person dies. For example, life insurance.	PATRIMONIO – Todo lo que una persona (viva o muerta) posee y debe. Hay diferentes tipos de patrimonio, como por testamento, sin testamento, acciones, y propiedades sujetas a impuestos. Patrimonio en testamento: la propiedad en el testamento de una persona. O si no tiene un testamento, la propiedad es sometida al tribunal testamentario. Patrimonio sin testamento: la propiedad que el tribunal testamentario no maneja. Por ejemplo, si hay un fideicomiso o condominio. Propiedad de Fideicomiso: la propiedad en un fideicomiso. Un fideicomisario controla el fideicomiso. La Propiedad Taxable: La propiedad sujeta al impuesto federal cuando una persona muere. Por ejemplo, los seguros de vida.
EXCESSIVE FORCE – Use of unreasonable amount of force by police officer.	FUERZA EXCESIVA – El uso de fuerza desproporcionada por un oficial de policía.
EXPERT TESTIMONY – Testimony given in relation to some scientific, technical, or professional matter by experts, i.e., person qualified to speak authoritatively by reason of their special training, skill, or familiarity with the subject.	TESTIMONIO DE EXPERTO – El testimonio que es dado en relación a algún asunto científico, técnico o profesional por expertos; es decir, personas calificadas para opinar autoritariamente por su instrucción especial, habilidad, o familiaridad con el tema.

FAIR MARKET VALUE – The cash value price that the property would have brought at the time it was taken.	VALOR JUSTO DE MERCADO – El valor en efectivo que la propiedad hubiera costado cuando fue comprada.
Felony murder	homicidio preterintencional
File (vb.)	presentar, radicar
File an appeal	interponer una apelación

File for bankruptcy	presentar una petición de quiebra
FINE – The money a person must pay as punishment for doing something illegal or for not doing something they were supposed to do.	MULTA – El dinero que la persona debe pagar como castigo por haber hecho algo ilegal o por no hacer lo que debía de hacer.
Freedom of speech	libertad de palabra , expresión
frivolous suit	juicio sin fundamento

GROSS NEGLIGENCE – A negligent act(s) which is reckless or flagrant and which is such a departure from conduct of an ordinary, prudent person under the same circumstances as to be contrary to a proper regard for human life or to constitute indifference to the consequences of those acts. The facts must be such that the consequences of the negligent act(s) could reasonably have been foreseen and it must appear that the death/danger to human life was not the result of inattention or mistaken judgment, but the natural and probable result of reckless or flagrantly negligent act.	NEGLIGENCIA GRAVE – Un acto (o actos) negligente que es imprudente o flagrante y que está fuera de la conducta de una persona ordinaria y prudente bajo las mismas circunstancias, lo contrario a la consideración apropiada para la vida humana o que constituye indiferencia a las consecuencias de esos actos. Los hechos deben ser tales que las consecuencias del acto negligente pudieran haber sido previstas razonablemente y debe parecer que la muerte/el peligro a la vida humana no era el resultado de falta de atención ni juicio erróneo, sino del resultado natural y probable del acto de descuido o negligencia flagrante.
Gross wages	Sueldo bruto
Guardian	tutor
guardage	tutela

Hear a case	ver una causa
Hearing	audiencia
HOMICIDE – The unlawful killing of one human being by another.	HOMICIDIO – La muerte ilegal de un ser humano por otro ser humano.

Income tax	impuesto sobre el ingreso (la renta)
Indictment	acusación formal, pliego acusatorio, documento inculpatorio
IMMINENT PERIL – Certain, immediate, and impending danger.	PELIGRO INMINENTE – Peligro cierto, inmediato e inminente.
INDEMNITY – An obligation to provide compensation (usually money) for a loss, hurt or damage.	INDEMNIZACIÓN – Una obligación de proporcionar compensación (generalmente en dinero) por una pérdida, lesión o daño.

Injury	lesión, perjuicio (definición: cualquier daño hecho al cuerpo, bienes, reputación o derechos de una persona)
INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY – A belief in the American legal system which states that all people accused of a criminal act are considered not to have committed the crime until the evidence leaves no doubt in the mind of the court or the jury that the accused did or did not commit the crime.	INOCENTE HASTA QUE NO SE PRUEBE LO CONTRARIO – Un precedente del sistema legal americano que declara que todas las personas acusadas de un delito son consideradas de no haber cometido el delito hasta que la evidencia no deje duda en la mente del tribunal o el jurado que el acusado cometió o no el crimen.
INSANITY PLEA – A claim by a defendant that he or she lacks the soundness of mind required by law to accept responsibility for a criminal act.	DECLARACIÓN DE DEMENCIA – Un demanda en la que el acusado sostiene que carece de la sanidad mental requerida por la ley para aceptar responsabilidad por un acto delictivo.
INTERLOCUTORY – Provisional; not final. An interlocutory appeal concerns only a part of the issues raised in a lawsuit. (Compare to DECREE.)	INTERLOCUTORIO – Provisional; no final. Una apelación interlocutoria concierne sólo a una parte de los hechos considerados en el litigio.
INTENT TO DEFAUD – To have in mind a purpose to cheat or trick someone. For example, purposely writing a bad check.	INTENTO DE DEFRAUDAR – Tener el propósito de estafar o engañar a alguien. Por ejemplo, escribiendo intencionalmente un cheque sin fondos.
INTERPRETER – A person who is certified as being able to translate, orally or in writing, spoken or sign language into the common language of the court.	INTÉRPRETE – Una persona que es certificada como capaz de traducir, oralmente o por escrito, hablado o por idioma de signos en el lenguaje común del tribunal.

JOINT VENTURE – An association of persons jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise. Unlike a partnership, a joint venture does not entail a continuing relationship among the parties.	EMPRESA CONJUNTA – Una asociación de personas formando colectivamente una empresa comercial. A diferencia de una asociación, una empresa conjunta no supone o crea una relación continua entre las partes.	Das Jointventure
JUDGE – An elected or appointed public official with authority to hear and decide cases in a court of law.	Juez	Richter
Judge of Superior Court	Juez del Tribunal Superior	
Judge of the Appellate Division	Juez de la División de Apelaciones	
Judge of the Municipal Court	Juez del Juzgado Municipal	
JUDGMENT (JUDGEMENT) – The judge's final decision in a case. It says how much the person who lost has to pay the person who won, and when. Sometimes, you can change part of the judgment with a hearing.	Fallo, adjudicación, fallo adjudicatorio – La decisión final del juez en un caso. Declara cuánto tiene que pagar la persona que perdió a la persona que ganó, y cuándo. A veces se puede cambiar una parte del fallo con una audiencia.	
JUDGMENT CREDITOR – The person who wins the case.		
JUDGMENT DEBTOR – The person who loses the case.		

JURAT – Certificate of officer or person before whom writing was sworn to. The clause written at the foot of an affidavit, stating where, when, and before whom the affidavit was sworn.	CERTIFICADO DEL NOTARIO – Certificado de un notario o persona ante quien una escritura fue otorgada. La cláusula escrita en la parte inferior de una declaración, indicando dónde, cuándo y ante quién la declaración fue elevada a público.
JURISDICTION – (1) The legal authority of a court to hear and decide a case. (2) The geographic area over which the court has authority to decide cases. (3) the territory, subject matter, or persons over which lawful authority may be exercised by a court.	JURISDICCION – (1) La autoridad legal de un tribunal para conocer y decidir un caso. (2) El área geográfica sobre la cual el tribunal tiene autoridad para decidir los casos. (3) territorio, tema, o personas sobre los cuales la autoridad legal puede ser ejercitada por un Tribunal.
JURISPRUDENCE – The study of law and the structure of the legal system.	Ciencia del Derecho, Doctrina Legal (die) Rechtsprechung
JUROR – Member of the jury.	JURADO – Miembro del jurado.
Jury	Jurado
JUSTIFICATION – A lawful or sufficient reason for one's acts or omissions. A defense of justification is a showing of a sufficient reason for an action by defendant. For example, in an assault prosecution against a defendant, a justification would be that the violence was necessary.	JUSTIFICACION – Una razón lícita o suficiente para las acciones o las omisiones de una persona. Una defensa de justificación muestra suficientes razones para una acción de parte del acusado. Por ejemplo, en una acusación de agresión contra el demandado, una justificación sería que la violencia era necesaria.
JUVENILE – A person under 18 years old. (See also MINOR.)	JOVEN – Una persona menor de 18 años de edad.

killing by misadventure	homicidio accidental
KNOWINGLY – With knowledge, willfully or intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense.	A SABIENDAS – Con conocimiento, voluntariamente o intencionalmente con respecto a un elemento material de una ofensa.

Labor union	sindicato de trabajadores
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENT – A sworn peace officer with legal authorization to arrest individuals under suspicion of breaking the law.	AGENTE DE POLICIA – Un oficial juramentado del orden público (por ejemplo un policía) con la autorización legal de detener a individuos bajo sospecha de haber violado la ley.
lawsuit An action between two or more persons in the courts of law, not a criminal matter.	juicio, demanda, litigio (civil)
LEADING QUESTION – A question which instructs the witness how to answer or puts words in his mouth. Suggests to the witness the desired answer.	PREGUNTA SUGESTIVA – Una pregunta que instruye al testigo cómo contestar o pone palabras en su boca. Sugiere al testigo la respuesta deseada.
Lease (car)	arrendamiento con opción de compra, arrendamiento a largo plazo
Legal Aid	Asistencia Legal
Legal Services	Servicios Legales
Legislature	poder legislativo (m.), cuerpo legislativo
LENIENCY – Recommendation for a sentence less than the maximum allowed.	INDULGENCIA – La recomendación para una sentencia menor que el máximo tiempo permitido.

LIABILITY – Legal debts and obligations.	RESPONSABILIDAD – Deudas y obligaciones.	(die) Pflicht, Verantwortung
LIFE IMPRISONMENT – A type of sentence where the convicted criminal is ordered to spend the rest of his or her life in prison.	CADENA PERPETUA – Un tipo de sentencia por la que el condenado es ordenado a pasar el resto de su vida en prisión.	
LIS PENDENS – A pending suit.	LITISPENDENCIA – Un litigio pendiente.	
Litigant	litigante (m. o f.)	
Litigation	litigio	

maiden name	apellido de soltera	
MATERIAL EVIDENCE – That quality of evidence which tends to influence the judge and/or jury because of its logical connection with the issue.	EVIDENCIA MATERIAL – La calidad de la evidencia que tiende a influir al juez y/o al jurado por su conexión lógica con el asunto.	
MEDIATION – A process in which people that are having a dispute are helped by a neutral person to communicate so they can reach a settlement acceptable to both.	MEDIACIÓN – Un proceso en el que las personas que tienen una disputa son ayudadas por una persona neutral para comunicarse hasta que puedan llegar a un arreglo aceptable para las dos partes.	
MENS REA – The “guilty mind” necessary to establish criminal responsibility.	PROPOSITO O INTENCIÓN CRIMINAL – “La mentalidad culpable” necesaria para establecer responsabilidad criminal.	
MINOR – A child under the age of 18 years. (See also JUVENILE).	MENOR – Un niño menor de la edad de 18 años.	
Minor complaints	acusaciones de poca gravedad, denuncias de poca gravedad	
MISTAKE – Some unintentional act, omission, or error arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition, or misplaced confidence.	ERROR – Acto involuntario, omisión, o error que surge de ignorancia, sorpresa, imposición, o confianza extraviada.	
Mistrial	juicio nulo (declarar nulo el juicio)	
MURDER – The unlawful killing of a human being with deliberate intent to kill.	ASESINATO – La muerte ilegal de un ser humano con el intento deliberado de matar.	

NECESSITY – Controlling force; irresistible compulsion; a power or impulse so great that it admits no choice of conduct.	NECESIDAD – Fuerza que controla; compulsión irresistible; un poder o impulso tan grande que no admite una conducta diferente.
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NEGLECT – Absence of care or attention in the doing or omission of a given act.	DESCUIDO – Falta de cuidado o atención al hacer u omitir un acto específico.
NEGLIGENCE – When someone fails to be as careful as the law requires to protect the rights and property of others.	NEGLIGENCIA – Cuando una persona no es tan cuidadosa como la ley requiere para proteger los derechos y la propiedad de otros.
NUISANCE – That activity which arises from unreasonable, unwarranted or unlawful use by a person of his own property, and producing such material annoyance resulting in damage.	ACTIVIDADES DANINAS (MOLESTAS, NOCIVAS O PELIGROSAS) –Aquella actividad que surge del uso irracional, injustificable o ilegal por una persona de su propia propiedad, que produce tal molestia material que resula en daños.

OBJECT – To protest to the court against an act or omission by the opposing party.	OBJETAR – Protestar ante el tribunal en contra de un acto u omisión por la parte opuesta.
OFFENDER – One who commits a crime, such as a felony, misdemeanor, or other punishable unlawful act.	DELINCUENTE – Persona que comete un delito, tal como una felonía, delito menor, u otro acto ilícito.
Office of the Prosecutor	Fiscalía
Office of the Public Defender	Oficina del abogado de Oficio
Ombudsman	Defensor del Pueblo
OPENING ARGUMENT – The initial statement made by attorneys for each side, outlining the facts each intends to establish during the trial.	ALEGATO INICIAL – La declaración inicial hecha por los abogados de cada una de las partes, resumiendo los hechos que cada uno piensa establecer durante el juicio.
OPPOSITION – (1) act of opposing or resisting. (2) confronting another.	OPOSICIÓN – (1) el acto de oponer o resistir. (2) confrontar a otro.
ORDINANCE – A regulation made by a local government to enforce, control, or limit certain activities.	ORDENANZA – Una regulación hecha por una administración municipal para imponer, controlar o limitar ciertas actividades.

PAROLE - Supervised release of a prisoner that allows the person to serve the rest of the sentence out of prison if all conditions of release are met.	libertad condicional
PARTY One of the sides of a case. The person who started the case is called the plaintiff or defendant. The person being sued is called the defendant or respondent.	parte
PENALTY – Punishment for breaking a law.	PENA – Castigo por violar la ley.
PERMANENT RESIDENT – One who lives in a location for a period of time and indicates that it is their official address or residence.	RESIDENTE PERMANENTE – Persona que vive en una dirección por un espacio de tiempo que indica que esa es su dirección o su residencia oficial.

Personal Injury	lesiones corporales	
PLAINTIFF (civil) The person or company that files a lawsuit.	actor, demandante, acusador (m. o f.)	
PLEAD – To admit or deny committing a crime.	DECLARARSE – Admitir o negar haber cometido un crimen.	
Plead guilty	declararse culpable	
POWER OF ATTORNEY – Formal authorization of a person to act in the interest of another person.	POR PODER – La autorización formal de una persona para actuar en el interés de otra.	
PRELIMINARY HEARING – The hearing available to a person charged with a felony to determine if there is enough evidence (probable cause) to hold him for trial.	AUDIENCIA PRELIMINAR – Audiencia disponible a una persona acusada de un delito grave para determinar si existe suficiente evidencia (causa probable) para un juicio.	
PRESUMPTION – An inference of the truth or falsity of a proposition or fact, that stands until rebutted by evidence to the contrary.	PRESUNCION – Dedución de verdad or falsedad de una propuesta o hecho, que permanece hasta ser refutada por evidencia contraria.	
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE – A hallowed principle of criminal law that a person is innocent of a crime until proven guilty. The government has the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant has no burden to prove his innocence.	PRESUNCION DE INOCENCIA – Un principio sagrado de derecho penal que afirma que una persona es inocente hasta que pruebe lo contrario. El gobierno tiene la obligación de demostrar cada elemento de un crimen más allá de una duda razonable y el acusado no tiene la obligación de demostrar su inocencia.	
PRESUMPTION OF LAW – a rule of law that courts and judges shall draw a particular inference from a particular fact, or from particular evidence.	PRESUNCION LEGAL– Una regla legal que afirma que tribunales y jueces deben de hacer una deducción particular de un hecho particular, o por una evidencia particular.	
PRIVACY, RIGHT OF – The right to be left alone; the right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity.	INTIMIDAD/, EL DERECHO A LA – El derecho de ser dejado en paz; el derecho de una persona de no ser incomodada por publicidad injustificada.	
Proceedings	procedimientos; actas	
Product liability	responsabilidad civil del fabricante	
Professional practice	despacho/consulta profesional	
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY – A public office who prosecutes criminal cases for the state. See PROSECUTOR and DISTRICT ATTORNEY.	FISCAL – Oficina pública que procesa los casos criminales para el estado.	Staatsanwaltschaft

Sentence	sentencia, pena
Statutes provide	los estatutos estipulan
Statutory law	leyes estatutarias

Sue	entablar juicio, demandar
Testify	rendir testimonio, testificar
Tort	acto dañoso
Transcript	transcripción
Unauthorized practice of law	ejercicio de la abogacía sin autorización
Underlying crime	delito subyacente
Unemployment compensation	indemnización por desempleo
Venue	jurisdicción
Verbatim	al pie de la letra
Verdict	veredicto (e.g., rendir un veredicto)
void marriage	matrimonio inválido
Witness	testigo
Writ of execution	mandamiento de ejecución

to abandon an action lease contract according to law legal action - lawsuit arbitration legal adviser arbitration clause legal assistance assessment of damage legal charges - legal fees assignment legal department attorney - proxy holder legal domicile to authenticate legal proceedings - legal action to award a contract legal representative bankruptcy lessee - tenant bankruptcy petition letter of intents to be in force liability in contract bilateral agreement licensee binding lien creditor breach of contract limitation period to break an agreement magistrate - judge to break the law to mortgage cancellation date notary public certificate notice to certify to notify to cheat - to swindle omission code partial agreement to come into force to patent to come to terms patent competent court patent holder

conflict of interests patent office contracting party patent pending copyright per procuracionem - by proxy declarant power of attorney - proxy to declare null and void prescription to decline any responsibility principal deed of gift procedure defendant - accused protest to defraud proxy to dishonour (GB) - to dishonor (US) public officer dispute to put on record - to take minutes to draw up a contract quittance - acquittance effective date to refund - to pay back to endorse - to back to register a trademark to enforce a law registered exclusion clause - exemption clause registration charges - registration fees fair rent rent - lease - hire to file documents resolution fine responsibility - liability first mortgage revenue stamp fixed term contract to revoke fraud - swindle rights on industrial patent gentlemen's agreement royalties to give due notice rule - regulation guarantee deposit second mortgage

to have full legal powers separate signature to honour (GB) - to honor (US) to settle a dispute illegal - unlawful to sign a receipt illegally signature by proxy to implement an agreement specimen signature in case of controversy subcontractor in force sublease - sublet in good faith to sublease - to sublet indictment to sue industrial property to summon witnesses to infringe to take legal action injunction to take someone to court insolvent tax fraud to invalidate tenant jointly and severally tenderer judge the regulations in force judgement third

mortgage jurisprudence third-party guarantee justice trial venue lack of evidence unpatented to lapse - to be statute-barred upon notice lapsed verbal agreement law courts verdict lawyer (GB) - attorney (US) witness to lease - to rent - to let written agreement

Writing Business Letters

to	act on behalf of	on arrival of the goods
to	agree with	on behalf of
	always at your service	on condition that - provided that
	as agreed	on delivery
	as far as I'm concerned	on receipt of the order
	as far as the payment is concerned	on short notice
	as follows	on written request
	as per invoice	order to be confirmed
	as per to the conditions	our best attention
	as per your request	our offer is still open
	as requested	outside address
	as soon as possible	to pay the maximum attention to the matter
	at your convenience	payable in advance
	at your earliest convenience	please allow us
	at your expense	please send us
	awaiting your reply	please send us your instructions
to	be able to	prices are increasing
to	be authorised to	reach the destination
to	be characterised by	to refer to
to	be confident in	to return a letter to the sender
to	be delighted to	sell at the best
to	be held responsible for	to send under separate cover
to	be in arrears with payments	sender address
to	be in difficulty	short term
to	be interested in	similar to sample - up to sample
to	be late to	stop negotiations
to	be overrun with orders	to submit a sample
to	be prepared to - to be willing to	to suit the quality - to meet the quality
	before the date we agreed upon	to take into consideration
	Best regards	the aim of this letter
	body of the letter	the following items
	circular letter	the goods are available in our warehouse
	claim - letter of complaint	the goods are not similar to sample
to	come to a decision	the goods are sold out
to	come to an agreement - to reach an agreement	the goods arrived in good conditions
	complimentary close	the letter remained unanswered

to cope with the competition the matter in reference
 to correspond to the sample the meeting was cancelled
 to correspond with to our mutual benefit
 covering letter to the kind attention of
 due to oversight under separate cover
 enclosure - attachment up to an amount of
 to fix an appointment utmost care
 following your instructions we acknowledge receipt of
 from order receipt we apologise again for
 further to our letter - following our letter we apologise for
 goods listed below we apologise for the delay
 greeting we apologise for the mistake
 half-price we are sorry to have to
 to have the pleasure to we are sorry to inform you

 o have the power to we have received
 hereby we hope we'll receive the goods soon
 in case of need we look forward to your kind reply
 in compliance with - accordingly we must apologise for
 in due time - in due course we remain - our kindest regards
 in good condition we sent you
 in our favour we thank you in advance
 in partial payment we wish to inform you that
 in reply to your letter we would appreciate it if you could answer
 in the absence of we would appreciate your reply
 to inform in due time with no obligation - without commitment
 inside address with reference to - in reference to
 to let someone know in advance with the compliments of
 letter opening - beginning of the letter with the utmost care letterheading - heading with two weeks' notice to look forward to within the end of
 the month looking forward to an early reply within which looking forward to hearing from you without delay to make the goods available without
 notice to meet a demand would you please let us have to meet customer's requirements would you please let us know to meet the demand
 you ordered Messrs you requested to notify in advance about you sent us on advanced payment Yours faithfully (GB) - Yours truly
 (GB)

Max Weber

"Objectivity" in Social Science

There is no absolutely "objective" scientific analysis of culture – or put perhaps more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently for our purposes – of "social phenomena" independent of special and "one-sided" viewpoints according to which – expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously – they are selected, analysed and organised for expository

purposes. The reasons for this lie in the character of the cognitive goal of all research in social science which seeks to transcend the purely formal treatment of the legal or conventional norms regulating social life.

The type of social science in which we are interested is an empirical science of concrete reality. Our aim is the understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestations and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise. Now, as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way in which life confronts us in immediate concrete situations, it presents an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both "within" and "outside" ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our attention is focused on a single "object," for instance, a concrete act of exchange, as soon as we seriously attempt an exhaustive description of all the individual components of this "individual phenomenon," to say nothing of explaining it causally. All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation, and that only it is "important" in the sense of being "worthy of being known." But what are the criteria by which this segment is selected? It has often been thought that the decisive criterion in the cultural sciences, too, was in the last analysis, the "regular" recurrence of certain causal relationships. The "laws" which we are able to perceive in the infinitely manifold stream of events must – according to this conception – contain the scientifically "essential" aspect of reality. As soon as we have shown some causal relationship to be a "law," (i.e., if we have shown it to be universally valid by means of comprehensive historical induction, or have made it immediately and tangibly plausible according to our subjective experience), a great number of similar cases order themselves under the formula thus attained. Those elements in each individual event which are left unaccounted for by the selection of their elements subsumable under the "law" are considered as scientifically unintegrated residues which will be taken care of in the further perfection of the system of "laws." Alternatively they will be viewed as "accidental" and therefore scientifically unimportant because they do not fit into the structure of the "law;" in other words, they are not typical of the event and hence can only be the objects of "idle curiosity." Accordingly, even among the followers of the Historical School we continually find the attitude which declares that the ideal, which all the sciences, including the cultural sciences, serve and toward which they should strive even in the remote future, is a system of propositions from which reality can be "deduced." As is well known, a leading natural scientist believed that he could designate the (factually unattainable) ideal goal of such a treatment of cultural reality as a sort of "astronomical" knowledge.

Let us not, for our part, spare ourselves the trouble of examining these matters more closely – however often they have already been discussed. The first thing that impresses one is that the "astronomical" knowledge which was referred to is not a system of laws at all. On the contrary, the laws which it presupposes have been taken from other disciplines like mechanics. But it too concerns itself with the question of the individual consequence which the working of these laws in a unique configuration produces, since it is these individual configurations which are significant for us. Every individual constellation which it "explains" or predicts is causally explicable only as the consequence of another equally individual constellation which has preceded it. As far back as we may go into the grey mist of the far-off past, the reality to which the laws apply always remains equally individual, equally undeducible from laws. A cosmic "primeval state" which had no individual character or less individual character than the cosmic reality of the present would naturally be a meaningless notion. But is there not some trace of similar ideas in our field in those propositions sometimes derived from natural law and sometimes verified by the observation of "primitives," concerning an economic-social "primeval state" free from historical "accidents," and characterised by phenomena such as "primitive agrarian communism," sexual "promiscuity," etc., from which individual historical development emerges by a sort of fall from grace into concreteness?

The social-scientific interest has its point of departure, of course, in the real, i.e., concrete, individually-structured configuration of our cultural life in its universal relationships which are themselves no less individually structured, and in its development out of other social cultural conditions, which themselves are obviously likewise individually structured. It is clear here that the situation which we illustrated by reference to astronomy as a limiting case (which is regularly drawn on by logicians for the same purpose) appears in a more accentuated form. Whereas in astronomy, the heavenly bodies are of interest to us only in their quantitative and exact aspects, the qualitative aspect of phenomena concerns us in the social sciences. To this should be added that in the social sciences we are concerned with psychological and intellectual phenomena the empathic understanding of which is naturally a problem of a specifically different type from those which the schemes of the exact natural sciences in general can or seek to solve. Despite that, this distinction in itself is not a distinction in principle, as it seems at first glance. Aside from pure mechanics, even the exact natural sciences do not proceed without qualitative categories. Furthermore, in our own field we encounter the idea (which is obviously distorted) that at least the phenomena characteristic of a money-economy – which are basic to our culture – are quantifiable and on that account subject to formulation as "laws." Finally it depends on the breadth or narrowness of one's definition of "law" as to whether one will also include regularities which because they are not quantifiable are not subject to numerical analysis. Especially insofar as the influence of psychological and intellectual factors is concerned, it does not in any case exclude the establishment of rules governing rational conduct. Above all, the point of view still persists which claims that the task of psychology is to play a role comparable to mathematics for the Geisteswissenschaften in the sense that it analyses the complicated phenomena of social life into their psychic conditions and effects, reduces them to their most elementary possible psychic factors and then

analyses their functional interdependences. Thereby a sort of “chemistry,” if not “mechanics,” of the psychic foundations of social life would be created. Whether such investigations can produce valuable and – what is something else – useful results for the cultural sciences, we cannot decide here. But this would be irrelevant to the question as to whether the aim of socioeconomic knowledge in our sense, i.e., knowledge of reality with respect to its cultural significance and its causal relationships, can be attained through the quest for recurrent sequences. Let us assume that we have succeeded by means of psychology or otherwise in analysing all the observed and imaginable relationships, of social phenomena into some ultimate elementary “factors,” that we have made an exhaustive analysis and classification of them and then formulated rigorously exact laws covering their behaviour. – What would be the significance of these results for our knowledge of the historically given culture or any individual phase thereof, such as capitalism, in its development and cultural significance? As an analytical tool, it would be as useful as a textbook of organic chemical combinations would be for our knowledge of the biogenetic aspect of the animal and plant world. In each case, certainly an important and useful preliminary step would have been taken. In neither case can concrete reality be deduced from “laws” and “factors.” This is not because some higher mysterious powers reside in living phenomena (such as “dominants,” “entelechies,” or whatever they might be called). This, however, presents a problem in its own right. The real reason is that the analysis of reality is concerned with the configuration into which those (hypothetical!) “factors” are arranged to form a cultural phenomenon which is historically significant to us. Furthermore, if we wish to “explain” this individual configuration “causally” we must invoke other equally individual configurations on the basis of which we will explain it with the aid of those (hypothetical!) “laws.”

The determination of those (hypothetical) “laws” and “factors” would in any case only be the first of the many operations which would lead us to the desired type of knowledge. The analysis of the historically given individual configuration of those “factors” and their significant concrete interaction, conditioned by their historical context and especially the rendering intelligible of the basis and type of this significance would be the next task to be achieved. This task must be achieved, it is true, by the utilisation of the preliminary analysis, but it is nonetheless an entirely new and distinct task. The tracing as far into the past as possible of the individual features of these historically evolved configurations which are contemporaneously significant, and their historical explanation by antecedent and equally individual configurations would be the third task. Finally the prediction of possible future constellations would be a conceivable fourth task.

For all these purposes, clear concepts and the knowledge of those (hypothetical) “laws” are obviously of great value as heuristic means – but only as such. Indeed they are quite indispensable for this purpose. But even in this function their limitations become evident at a decisive point. In stating this, we arrive at the decisive feature of the method of the cultural sciences. We have designated as “cultural sciences” those disciplines which analyse the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural significance. The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws, however perfect it may be, since the significance of cultural events presupposes a value-orientation toward these events. The concept of culture is a value-concept. Empirical reality becomes “culture” to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes those segments and only those segments of reality which have become significant to us because of this value-relevance. Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to us due to their connection with our values. Only because and to the extent that this is the case is it worthwhile for us to know it in its individual features. We cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means of a “presuppositionless” investigation of empirical data. Rather, perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation. Meaningfulness naturally does not coincide with laws as such, and the more general the law the less the coincidence. For the specific meaning which a phenomenon has for us is naturally not to be found in those relationships which it shares with many other phenomena.

The focus of attention on reality under the guidance of values which lend it significance and the selection and ordering of the phenomena which are thus affected in the light of their cultural significance is entirely different from the analysis of reality in terms of laws and general concepts. Neither of these two types of the analysis of reality has any necessary logical relationship with the other. They can coincide in individual instances but it would be most disastrous if their occasional coincidence caused us to think that they were not distinct in principle. The cultural significance of a phenomenon, e.g., the significance of exchange in a money economy, can be the fact that it exists on a mass scale as a fundamental component of modern culture. But the historical fact that it plays this role must be causally explained in order to render its cultural significance understandable. The analysis of the general aspects of exchange and the technique of the market is a – highly important and indispensable – preliminary task. For not only does this type of analysis leave unanswered the question as to how exchange historically acquired its fundamental significance in the modern world; but above all else, the fact with which we are primarily concerned, namely, the cultural significance of the money-economy – for the sake of which we are interested in the description of exchange technique, and for the sake of which alone a science exists which deals with that technique – is not derivable from any “law.” The generic features of exchange, purchase, etc., interest the jurist – but we are concerned with the analysis of the cultural significance of the concrete historical fact that today exchange exists on a mass scale. When we require an explanation, when we wish to understand what distinguishes the social-economic aspects of our culture, for instance, from that of Antiquity, in which exchange showed precisely the same generic traits as it does today, and when we raise the question as to where the significance of “money

economy" lies, logical principles of quite heterogeneous derivation enter into the investigation. We will apply those concepts with which we are provided by the investigation of the general features of economic mass phenomena – indeed, insofar as they are relevant to the meaningful aspects of our culture, we shall use them as means of exposition. The goal of our investigation is not reached through the exposition of those laws and concepts, precise as it may be. The question as to what should be the object of universal conceptualisation cannot be decided "presuppositionlessly" but only with reference to the significance which certain segments of that infinite multiplicity which we call "commerce" have for culture. We seek knowledge of an historical phenomenon, meaning by historical: significant in its individuality. And the decisive element in this is that only through the presupposition that a finite part alone of the infinite variety of phenomena is significant, does the knowledge of an individual phenomenon become logically meaningful. Even with the widest imaginable knowledge of "laws," we are helpless in the face of the question: how is the causal explanation of an individual fact possible – since a description of even the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive? The number and type of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is nothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone meriting attention. A chaos of "existential judgments" about countless individual events would be the only result of a serious attempt to analyse reality "without presuppositions." And even this result is only seemingly possible, since every single perception discloses on closer examination an infinite number of constituent perceptions which can never be exhaustively expressed in a judgment. Order is brought into this chaos only on the condition that in every case only a part of concrete reality is interesting and significant to us, because only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach reality. Only certain sides of the infinitely complex concrete phenomenon, namely those to which we attribute a general cultural significance, are therefore worthwhile knowing. They alone are objects of causal explanation. And even this causal explanation evinces the same character; an exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete phenomena in its full reality is not only practically impossible – it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to be imputed in the individual case, the "essential" feature of an event. Where the individuality of a phenomenon is concerned, the question of causality is not a question of laws but of concrete causal relationships; it is not a question of the subsumption of the event under some general rubric as a representative case but of its imputation as a consequence of some constellation. It is in brief a question of imputation. Wherever the causal explanation of a "cultural phenomenon" – a "historical individual" is under consideration, the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investigation but only a means. It facilitates and renders possible the causal imputation to their concrete causes of those components of a phenomenon the individuality of which is culturally significant. So far and only so far as it achieves this, is it valuable for our knowledge of concrete relationships. And the more "general" (i.e., the more abstract) the laws, the less they can contribute to the causal imputation of individual phenomena and, more indirectly, to the understanding of the significance of cultural events.

What is the consequence of all this?

Naturally, it does not imply that the knowledge of universal propositions, the construction of abstract concepts, the knowledge of regularities and the attempt to formulate "laws" have no scientific justification in the cultural sciences. Quite the contrary, if the causal knowledge of the historians consists of the imputation of concrete effects to concrete causes, a valid imputation of any individual effect without the application of "nomological" knowledge – i.e., the knowledge of recurrent causal sequences - would in general be impossible. Whether a single individual component of a relationship is, in a concrete case, to be assigned causal responsibility for an effect, the causal explanation of which is at issue, can in doubtful cases be determined only by estimating the effects which we generally expect from it and from the other components of the same complex which are relevant to the explanation. In other words, the "adequate" effects of the causal elements involved must be considered in arriving at any such conclusion. The extent to which the historian (in the widest sense of the word) can perform this imputation in a reasonably certain manner, with his imagination sharpened by personal experience and trained in analytic methods, and the extent to which he must have recourse to the aid of special disciplines which make it possible, varies with the individual case. Everywhere, however, and hence also in the sphere of complicated economic processes, the more certain and the more comprehensive our general knowledge the greater is the certainty of imputation. This proposition is not in the least affected by the fact that even in the case of all so-called "economic laws" without exception, we are concerned here not with "laws" in the narrower exact natural-science sense, but with adequate causal relationships expressed in rules and with the application of the category of "objective possibility." The establishment of such regularities is not the end but rather the means of knowledge. It is entirely a question of expediency, to be settled separately for each individual case, whether a regularly recurrent causal relationship of everyday experience should be formulated into a "law." Laws are important and valuable in the exact natural sciences, in the measure that those sciences are universally valid. For the knowledge of historical phenomena in their concreteness, the most general laws, because they are most devoid of content, are also the least valuable. The more comprehensive the validity – or scope – of a term, the more it leads us away from the richness of reality since in order to include the common elements of the largest possible number of phenomena, it must necessarily be as abstract as possible and hence devoid of content. In the cultural sciences, the knowledge of the universal or general is never valuable in itself.

The conclusion which follows from the above is that an "objective" analysis of cultural events, which proceeds according to the thesis that the ideal of science is the reduction of empirical reality to "laws," is meaningless. It is not meaningless, as is often maintained, because cultural or psychic events for instance are "objectively" less governed by laws. It is meaningless for a number of other reasons. Firstly, because the knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used by our minds for attaining this end;

secondly, because knowledge of cultural events is inconceivable except on a basis of the significance which the concrete constellations of reality have for us in certain individual concrete situations. In which sense and in which situations this is the case is not revealed to us by any law; it is decided according to the value-ideas in the light of which we view "culture" in each individual case. "Culture" is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance. This is true even for the human being who views a particular culture as a mortal enemy and who seeks to "return to nature." He can attain this point of view only after viewing the culture in which he lives from the standpoint of his values, and finding it "too soft." This is the purely logical-formal fact which is involved when we speak of the logically necessary rootedness of all historical entities in "evaluative ideas." The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding a certain culture or any "culture" in general to be valuable but rather in the fact that we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude toward the world and to lend it significance. Whatever this significance may be, it will lead us to judge certain phenomena of human existence in its light and to respond to them as being (positively or negatively) meaningful. Whatever may be the content of this attitude, these phenomena have cultural significance for us and on this significance alone rests its scientific interest. Thus when we speak here of the conditioning of cultural knowledge through evaluative ideas (following the terminology of modern logic), it is done in the hope that we will not be subject to crude misunderstandings such as the opinion that cultural significance should be attributed only to valuable phenomena. Prostitution is a cultural phenomenon just as much as religion or money. All three are cultural phenomena only because, and only insofar as, their existence and the form which they historically assume touch directly or indirectly on our cultural interests and arouse our striving for knowledge concerning problems brought into focus by the evaluative ideas which give significance to the fragment of reality analysed by those concepts.

All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view. When we require from the historian and social research worker as an elementary presupposition that they distinguish the important from the trivial and that they should have the necessary "point of view" for this distinction, we mean that they must understand how to relate the events of the real world consciously or unconsciously to universal "cultural values," and to select out those relationships which are significant for us. If the notion that those standpoints can be derived from the "facts themselves" continually recurs, it is due to the naive self-deception of the specialist, who is unaware that it is due to the evaluative ideas with which he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which he concerns himself. In connection with this selection of individual special "aspects" of the event, which always and everywhere occurs, consciously or unconsciously, there also occurs that element of cultural-scientific work which is referred to by the often-heard assertion that the "personal" element of a scientific work is what is really valuable in it, and that personality must be expressed in every work if its existence is to be justified. To be sure, without the investigator's evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality. Just as without the investigator's conviction regarding the significance of particular cultural facts, every attempt to analyse concrete reality is absolutely meaningless, so the direction of his personal belief, the refraction of values in the prism of his mind, gives direction to his work. And the values to which the scientific genius relates the object of his inquiry may determine (i.e., decide) the "conception" of a whole epoch, not only concerning what is regarded as "valuable," but also concerning what is significant or insignificant, "important" or "unimportant" in the phenomena.

Accordingly, cultural science in our sense involves "subjective" presuppositions insofar as it concerns itself only with those components of reality which have some relationship, however indirect, to events to which we attach cultural significance. Nonetheless, it is entirely causal knowledge exactly in the same sense as the knowledge of significant concrete natural events which have a qualitative character. Among the many confusions which the overreaching tendency of a formal-juristic outlook has brought about in the cultural sciences, there has recently appeared the attempt to "refute" the "materialistic conception of history" by a series of clever but fallacious arguments which state that since all economic life must take place in legally or conventionally regulated forms, all economic "development" must take the form of striving for the creation of new legal forms. Hence it is said to be intelligible only through ethical maxims, and is on this account essentially different from every type of "natural" development. Accordingly the knowledge of economic development is said to be "teleological" in character. Without wishing to discuss the meaning of the ambiguous term "development," or the logically no-less-ambiguous term "teleology" in the social sciences, it should be stated that such knowledge need not be "teleological" in the sense assumed by this point of view. The cultural significance of normatively regulated legal relations and even norms themselves can undergo fundamental revolutionary changes even under conditions of the formal identity of the prevailing legal norms. Indeed, if one wishes to lose one's self for a moment in fantasies about the future, one might theoretically imagine, let us say, the "socialisation of the means of production" unaccompanied by any conscious "striving" toward this result, and without even the disappearance or addition of a single paragraph of our legal code; the statistical frequency of certain legally regulated relationships might be changed fundamentally, and in many cases, even disappear entirely; a great number of legal norms might become practically meaningless and their whole cultural significance changed beyond identification. *De lege ferenda* discussions may be justifiably disregarded by the "materialistic conception of history," since its central proposition is the indeed inevitable change in the significance of legal institutions. Those who view the painstaking labor of causally understanding historical reality as of secondary importance can disregard it, but it is impossible to supplant it by any type of a "teleology." From our viewpoint, "purpose" is the conception of an effect which becomes a cause of an action. Since we take into account every cause which produces or can produce a significant effect, we also consider this one. Its specific significance consists only in the fact that we not only observe human conduct but can and desire to understand it.

Undoubtedly, all evaluative ideas are "subjective." Between the "historical" interest in a family chronicle and that in the development of the greatest conceivable cultural phenomena which were and are common to a nation or to mankind over long epochs, there exists an infinite gradation of "significance" arranged into an order which differs for each of us. And they are, naturally, historically variable in accordance with the character of the culture and the ideas which rule men's minds. But it obviously does not follow from this that research in the cultural sciences can only have results which are "subjective" in the sense that they are valid for one person and not for others. Only the degree to which they interest different persons varies. In other words, the choice of the object of investigation and the extent or depth to which this investigation attempts to penetrate into the infinite causal web, are determined by the evaluative ideas which dominate the investigator and his age. In the method of investigation, the guiding "point of view" is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their use, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth.